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Federal regulation 
should complement, 
not contradict, the market forces 
working to 
promote safety 
In the heated atmosphere 
generated by inch-high 
headlines and multimil­
lion-dollar liability suits, 
two important facts often 
get lost. First, society's 
awareness of what ensur­
ing reasonably complete 
safety would cost rarely 
matches the intensity of its 
demands for such assur­
ance. And second, the most 
powerful forces working to 
make products and work­
places safer are not the 
edicts of government but 
the dynamics of the mar­
ket. 1tue, there are situa­
tions in which the market 
cannot by itself create effec­
tive incentives for safety, 
but in the vast ma;ority 
of cases it can-and does. 
Drawing on his extensive 
research into the regula­
tion of risk, the author 
both describes the nature 
and extent of those incen­
tives and offers guidelines 
for identifying the kinds of 
situation in which they are 
not likely to operate. For 
these instances, where fed­
eral regulation is essential, 
the author strongly recom­
mends modes of govern­
ment involvement that try 
to duplicate or extend the 
market mechanism. 
Mr. Viscusi is professor of 
business administration, 
economics, and law at 
Duke University's Fuqua 
School of Business and di­
rector of its Center for the 
Study of Business Regula­
tion. He is the author of 
Risk by Choice: Regulating 
Health and Safety in the 
Workplace (Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1983). 
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For some time now, government's ap­
proach to the regulation of product and process safety 
has been absolutist and inflexible. Once it identifies a 
hazard, government usually declares that it is harmful, 
decides it should be eliminated, and then establishes 
technology-based standards to cut the perceived safety 
risk to the lowest possible level. Although meant to 
promote a no-risk society; this approach has led to 
much regulation that is unworkable. 
In some instances, the ill-conceived na­
ture of these regulations has been obvious all along. 
Remember, for example, OSHA's early efforts to regu­
late the shape of toilet seats and to require that work­
ers on bridges wear life jackets even in cases where the 
riverbeds below were dry. In others, well-intended ac­
tions produced unintended results. Clothing manufac­
turers used the chemical Tris to comply with nonflam­
mability requirements for children's sleepwear; only 
later did scientific evidence indicate that Tris is poten­
tially carcinogenic. 
The point, of course, is not that most 
safety regulation is so inadequate and misguided or 
that government has no proper role in promoting 
safety. The point is rather that without a clear under­
standing of how market forces place a value on risk 
and help to reduce it, neither government nor industry 
can make socially desirable choices-and make them 
work. 
Even the most diehard critics of OSHA 
would not question the need for government regula­
tion to, say; limit the cancer risks posed by a catastro­
phe at a nuclear power plant. Where markets are im­
perfect, a federal presence may indeed be necessary. In 
practice, however, the real problem has not been to find 
a legitimate rationale for such regulation but to bal­
ance stringency with effectiveness in setting regula­
tory policy. 
When the Environmental Protection 
Agency began to control air pollution, it imposed an 
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emissions standard on each point source of pollution. 
By forcing companies to invest in control measures for 
each smokestack in a plant, it prevented managers 
from concentrating their resources in the most cost­
effective manner. More recently, the EPA's "bubble" 
policy has allowed managers to treat an entire plant as 
a single pollution source and, as a result, to put their ef­
forts where they will do the most good.1 
Regulatory approaches that permit such 
trade-offs remain the exception, however. Most health 
and safety regulations still hinge on narrowly defined 
engineering requirements and performance criteria. 
Why? The answer is clear: these efforts reflect a funda­
mental mistrust of the market and an unwillingness to 
use the many powerful incentives for safety generated 
by the decisions of workers, consumers, and companies. 
How markets promote 
safety 
In most cases, market decisions will 
lead to efficient levels of safety if: (1) adequate informa­
tion about risks is readily available, (2) individuals are 
aware of the risks they face, and (3) the risks they incur 
are the result of their own voluntary and informed 
decisions. 
T hese conditions do not always exist, 
nor does the market always give companies a financial 
incentive to promote safety. A manufacturer that 
dumps its toxic wastes near a municipal water supply 
creates a potential threat to public safety that purchas­
ers of the company's products are unlikely to experi­
ence directly. Hence they will be unwilling voluntarily 
to pay the higher prices needed to offset a safer waste 
disposal plan. Similarly, the chemical EDB may pose a 
risk to consumers of grain products. If, however, con­
sumers are unable to monitor EDB levels, the market 
mechanisms for promoting safety will not and cannot 
be effective. 
For the market to do an adequate job of 
regulating safety, all three of the criteria previously 
mentioned must be satisfied: availability of informa­
tion, awareness of risks, and voluntary choice to incur 
the risks. Market transactions that fail to meet these 
criteria-as, say, in the case of EDB, air pollution, toxic 
wastes, or nuclear power-leave room for the appropri­
ate intervention of government. 
In more extreme cases, for example, 
there are no transactions to speak of at all. Think, for 
example, of the genetic damage that the workplace ex­
posure of pregnant women to lead or other toxic sub­
stances could cause to the unborn and to children not 
yet conceived. There is no way the rights and concerns 
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of these future generations can be fairly and fully repre­
sented in market decisions about tolerable levels of 
risk. 
Usually, of course, real transactions do 
take place and do meet the necessary criteria. It is, for 
example, relatively easy to monitor the risks associat­
ed with construction work or work in a sawmill, and 
individuals can be expected to make well-informed 
choices about the risks they are willing to incur. In­
deed, since the time of Adam Smith, economists have 
observed that workers will demand extra pay or some 
other kind of compensation in return for taking on par­
ticular kinds and levels of risk. 
Wage premiums 
At times, labor contracts specify these 
forms of special compensation. Elephant handlers at 
the Philadelphia Zoo, for example, receive an annual 
wage premium of $1,000 because elephants pose a 
greater risk for handlers than do other animals. In the 
typical case, wage premiums grow out of job evalua­
tion systems and are not explicitly detailed in collec­
tive bargaining agreements. As a result, the only way to 
estimate the general magnitude of these premiums is 
to use statistical techniques to analyze large sets of na­
tional survey data on employment patterns. My re­
search suggests that, on average, U.S. workers receive 
just under $1,000 a year for the risks they face. 
These premiums reflect both the value 
workers attach to their safety and the degree to which 
they will accept trade-offs between dollars and per­
ceived risk. This value, in tum, reflects the implicit fi­
nancial value workers place on their lives in the face of 
a known statistical probability of injury or death. A 
$1,000 premium in a situation where the risk of death 
is 1 in1,000 implies a value of life equal to $1,000 di­
vided by 1/1,000, or $1 million. In practice, for workers 
in high-risk jobs, which pose an average risk of death of 
1 in 1,000 each year, the implicit value on each statisti­
cal life is roughly $600,000. For blue-collar workers in 
jobs where the risk of death is 1 in10,000 each year, the 
figure is close to $3 million. For individuals in very 
safe occupations, the statistical value per life can be as 
much as $6 million to $10 million. 
Exhibit I summarizes the contribution 
of these risk premiums to the wage costs of manufac­
turing industries. On average, these premiums account 
for some 6% of production workers' earnings. In rela­
tively safe industries such as chemicals, these costs 
may fall as low as 3% of earnings, but in industries like 
lumber and wood products, they rise to 15 % . Along 
1 See William Drayton, 
''Getting Smarter About Regulation,'' 
HBR fuly-August 1981, p. 38. 
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with absenteeism and turnover rates, these premiums 
can provide managers with a useful barometer of how 
workers perceive-and feel about-the safety risks in­
herent in their jobs. Equally important, the premiums 
give managers strong financial incentives to keep risk 
levels within reasonable limits. After all, each year 
industry spends an additional $ 70 billion on higher 
wages related to risk, not counting workers' compensa­
tion benefits, which add an extra $10 billion. 
The force of the market 
Compared with these stiff market­
driven costs, including the implicit threat of legal ac­
tion, the financial threat posed by OSHA penalties and 
the like are not very significant. True, the threat of an 
OSHA inspection has practical effects, particularly on 
companies facing an escalating schedule of penalties if 
they fail to make the mandated changes. Even so, total 
OSHA penalties for violations of health and safety 
standards were just over the $6 million level in 1983. 
The financial incentives for safety that the market 
created during that period were more than 10,000 
times as great. Even highly publicized accidents like 
the collapse of a cooling tower under construction in 
West Virginia, which took 51 lives, do not necessarily 
lead to a huge regulatory penalty. OSHA's fine in the 
West Virginia case: $108,000. 
It is, then, the forces of the marketplace 
itself, not government regulations, that provide the 
principal financial incentive to promote safety. As 
noted previously, these forces work best when safety 
risks are readily apparent and generate the kinds of ac­
cidents that are easy to tally and monitor. Dimly un­
derstood health risks with long-deferred effects that af­
fect less aware constituencies are much less suited to 
the market mechanism. They are, instead, best dealt 
with through government regulations that alter the in­
centives of market participants. 
Of course, some government actions­
for example, the Consumer Product Safety Commis­
sion's recent regulation of lawn mowers-needlessly 
address risks that the market can handle effectively. 
Based on the commission's own calculations, the bene­
fits of improved foot probe guards and a "deadman" 
control device requiring continuous contact with the 
mower handle are not worth the regulation's $200 mil­
lion annual cost. 
To be sure, the market may fail if partic­
ipants do not read the signals that risk generates. Com­
panies will often, for example, devote considerably 
greater attention to the well-publicized costs of prod­
uct liability lawsuits, which average only $225,000 per 
fatality, than to the risk premiums generated through 
wages and prices, which are an order of magnitude 
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larger but have no explicit price tag associated with 
them. This emphasis on product liability instead of on 
market valuation of safety led the Ford Motor Compa­
ny to place a statistical value on lives lost through gas 
tank explosions in the Pinto at $200,000 each and, as a 
result, to conclude that safety improvements were not 
worthwhile. 
Better understanding of how consumers 
value safety should lead to better safety-related deci­
sions. Nevertheless, there will always be situations in 
which consumers do not fully understand risks, com­
panies do not see how the cost of risk may affect them, 
or the risks themselves operate outside the market-as 
in, say, the case of pollution. Hence there will continue 
to be a long-term role for government regulations that 
complement-but do not contravene-the role of mar­
ket forces. 
Tamper-resistant 
packaging 
One of the most striking recent exam­
ples of how the market works to promote safety is 
tamper-resistant packaging. After seven Chicago area 
residents died from taking Extra-Strength Tylenol cap­
sules that had been poisoned, the Food and Drug Ad­
ministration issued extensive packaging requirements 
for over-the-counter drugs and cosmetics. Even in the 
absence of government action, it seems likely that 
companies would have made some such changes in 
packaging, but risk levels were sufficiently small that 
consumers might not have had enough information to 
make sound decisions. In addition, by helping to estab­
lish a benchmark for reasonable protective actions, the 
regulation reduced the threat of product liability law­
suits. On balance, then, was the regulation worthwhile? 
The answer depends, of course, on the 
assessment of overall costs and effects. At the least, a 
regulation should be in society's best interests and/or 
its benefits should exceed its costs. That the Office of 
Management and Budget now requires this test for all 
new regulations ( except when the agency's legislation 
prohibits the test) is, in effect, the government's way of 
asking whether the regulation would pass a market 
test if consumers fully understood the risk. That is, if 
they fully understood their benefits, would consumers 
be willing to pay the cost of putting better seals on con­
tainers sold over the counter? 
On the cost side of the equation, the 
Food and Drug Administration estimated that the new 
packaging requirements would affect nearly 2 billion 
containers a year. At 1 cent to 2 cents per container, the 
total bill would be approximately $31 million. Thus, if 
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the Chicago poisonings were otherwise an annual 
event, the regulation would save lives at a cost of $4.4 
million per life-a figure roughly comparable to the av­
erage statistical value of life for workers in hazardous 
jobs. 
These calculations do not offer grounds 
for a clear-cut endorsement or rejection of the FDA's 
policy. The expense of protecting such packages is not 
wildly inappropriate, nor is this policy's goal so desir­
able that it would be attractive even if it cost more or 
were a bit less effective in preserving life. In practice, 
the real benefits of the FDA's response have grown out 
of the speed with which it has acted. Without the 
quick establishment of guidelines for protective pack­
aging, affected companies would have had to defer im­
provements or risk adopting systems in conflict with 
what the FDA ultimately required. 
For consumers, the speedy action did 
much to alleviate anxieties that distorted their market 
preferences, but these distortions showed the true 
force of the market in creating incentives for safety. In 
the aftermath of the tampering incidents, Tylenol lost 
87% of its sales. The sheer size of this response dwarfed 
any incentives for safety that the tort liability system 
created. Had the seven deaths resulted from its negli­
gence rather than from tamperings, Johnson & Johnson 
would have faced much smaller financial penalties 
than those the market generated. If we can judge from 
the typical product liability awards for wrongful deaths, 
Johnson & Johnson would have paid less than $2 mil­
lion if it had been found liable for all seven deaths. 
To its great credit, Johnson & Johnson's 
response to the incident was in no way tentative. The 
company firmly reestablished Tylenol's acceptance 
among consumers by introducing a protective packag­
ing system that created three barriers to potential 
tampering-an approach that went well beyond that 
imposed by the FDA regulation. 
It is fair to ask, however, if the immense 
cost of this effort, some $100 million, was strictly jus­
tifiable in social terms. After all, there are many other 
ways to spend $100 million that are likely to be more 
effective in saving lives-improving guardrails on high­
ways, for example. Moreover, society's interest in pre­
serving Tylenol as a viable brand product, given avail­
able substitutes, is not great, although the brand's 
resurgence may well have discouraged other tamper­
ing episodes. The huge amount by which the private, 
market-based incentives for safety outweighed the 
public and the regulatory incentives is notable. 
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Reforming the regulatory 
environment 
To be effective, government policy in 
safety-related matters must complement the forces of 
the market rather than attempt to supplant them. 
Properly structured, the penalties for noncompliance 
with a government regulation ought to establish finan­
cial incentives for safety much like those the market 
generates. 
Carefully drawn incentives foster rea­
sonable trade-offs but not unreasonable and fantastical­
ly expensive efforts to reduce all risks to zero or even, 
as with EPA requirements for ambient air quality, to 
allow for a "margin of safety" below the zero risk level. 
Indeed, estimates of the price tag for risk and environ­
mental policies proposed between 1975 and 1980 alone 
ran from $370 billion to $1.1 trillion (1984 dollars). 
The first necessary reform, then, is to 
recognize that society has legitimate concerns other 
than risk reduction and that regulatory policies do im­
ply trade-offs among them. Ignoring this need for sensi­
ble balance among competing goals may lead to even 
riskier government policies. The FDA's pharmaceutical 
testing program, for example, attempts to minimize 
the risk of a potentially harmful drug going onto the 
market. In its efforts to err on the side of caution, the 
FDA incurs a substantial risk of a different type­
namely, that a beneficial drug will reach the market 
slowly or not at all. Some estimates of industry's fail­
ure to gain early approval for beta blockers put the an­
nual number of preventable deaths from cardiovascu­
lar disease at 10,000. 
Along with a more balanced regulatory 
approach, there is a need for reform in policy design. 
Federal agencies have, in effect, tried to dictate the 
technological choices that companies should make. It 
would be far more productive to give managers the lee­
way to select the most cost-effective technologies with 
which to satisfy the market's concern about risk reduc­
tion. These choices can make a real financial differ­
ence: engineering controls to reduce noise levels in the 
workplace cost $119,000 per case of hearing loss pre­
vented; protective devices that cut noise by the same 
amount cost only $15,000 per worker protected. 
Greater regulatory flexibility is also de­
sirable. Experiments like the introduction of the EPA's 
bubble policy remain the exception rather than the 
norm. OSHA, for example, still imposes expensive re­
quirements for machine guards that are so specific that 
they pertain to only one-sixth of all machines. Presi­
dent Ford's task force on OSHA tried to remedy these 
deficiencies by establishing a model performance­
oriented standard that gave managers a variety of op-
Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved.
Exhibit I 
Risk premiums 
of 3 % to 5 % 
Risk premiums 
of 6 % to 9 % 
Risk premiums 
of 12%to15 % 
Exhibit II 
Change in 
fraction who 
consider job 
above average 
in risk 
Annual wage 
increase 
demanded 
Change in 
fraction very 
likely or 
somewhat likely 
to quit 
Risk premiums as a percentage of total 
earnings in manufacturing industries* 
Chemicals and allied products 
Petroleum refining and related industries 
Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies 
Transportation equipment 
Instruments and related products 
Printing, publishing, and allied services 
Tobacco manufacturers 
Apparel and related products 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Textiles 
Paper and allied products 
Primary metals 
Rubber and plastics 
Fabricated metal products 
Leather and leather products 
Stone, clay, and glass products 
Food and allied products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Lumber and wood products 
*These premiums are derived from 
earnings equations that are estimates 
of the relat ionship between injury rates 
and workers' earnings. 
From W. Kip Viscusi, Employment 
Hazards: An Investigation of Market 
Performance 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics injury<ate 
data by industry. 
Workers' response to chemical labeling 
Chemical label 
Sodium 
blear· 
bonate 
-35 % 
$0 
-23 % 
Source: 
Chloro- TNT 
aceto-
phenone 
+45% +63% 
$ 1,900 $ 3,000 
+13% +52% 
Data from Table 4 of 
W. Kip Viscusi and Charles O'Connor, 
"Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labelin9: 
Are Workers Bay esian Decision Makers?' 
American Economic Review, 
December 1984, p. 949. 
Asbestos 
+58% 
$ 5,200 
+63% 
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tions for reducing machine-related injuries. Not only 
would the model standard have saved money; it would 
also have extended the percentage of machines cov­
ered. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, nothing came 
of this measure. 
Chemical labeling 
On balance, however, progress has been 
made toward engaging market forces-especially the 
force of better information -directly in the effort to 
promote safety. The government has long used warning 
on labels for cigarettes and pesticides as an alternative 
to banning these risky products. Chief among the 
newer uses of information is OSHA's chemical-labeling 
policy, a prime example of how public policies might 
be more effective if they took advantage of the con­
structive role of the market. 
With its price tag of $3 billion, OSHA's 
hazard communication proposal is the most expensive 
risk regulation the Reagan administration has issued. 
Its goal is to place warning labels on containers of haz­
ardous chemicals so that workers can take appropriate 
precautionary action and companies can give prompt 
and appropriate medical attention to individuals im­
properly exposed to the chemicals. This approach rep­
resents a dramatic shift in the tenor of OSHA policy. In 
the past, if a hazardous substance was present in the 
workplace, OSHA mandated that it be reduced to the 
lowest technologically feasible level. 
So uncompromising a policy is simply 
untenable. Scientific evidence shows that more than 
2,000 substances in the workplace are potentially car­
cinogenic. If OSHA chose to control these substances 
on a case-by-case basis, merely developing the regula­
tions would take decades. Indeed, given OSHA's pace in 
setting new health standards, the process might well 
take several centuries. How much more sensible, then, 
to use the risk-reducing capacity of workers' and man­
agers' actions. 
Companies in the petroleum and the 
paint and coating industries, for example, have already 
adopted such labeling programs to promote safety and 
to cut product liability costs. Communicating infor­
mation about potential hazards and suitable protective 
equipment to workers will help them distinguish the 
situations in which special care is necessary. Com­
municating this information also has the benefit of 
making the companies themselves aware of the haz­
ards that these substances pose and is thus more likely 
to promote the use of safe practices. 
To investigate further how chemical 
labeling influences the actions of workers, Charles 
O'Connor (a chemical labeling consultant) and I con­
ducted an experiment in which we monitored worker 
Copyright ©001. All Rights Reserved.
138 
response at several plants to four different chemical la­
bels. One of the chemicals was safe (sodium bicarbon­
ate); the remaining three were risky (chloroacetophe­
none, TNT, and asbestos). We showed each worker a 
warning label for a chemical that would replace those 
with which he or she was then working. As Exhibit II 
indicates, the sodium bicarbonate label led workers to 
believe that their jobs were below average in risk; the 
others increased their perception of danger. 
This kind of perceptual change helps in­
crease the precautions workers take. It also leads to a 
demand for higher pay-in our experiment, to demands 
ranging from $1,900 to $5,200 annually. If workers 
have long-term contracts and if job ratings change 
slowly, wage pressure will not be the most immediate 
expression of market forces. The market response will 
show up first in quit behavior. If the asbestos workers 
inpur study did not receive a boost in pay, almost two­
thirds of them would be likely to leave their jobs in the 
next year. 
Policies like chemical labeling will 
trigger various sorts of market forces-changes in risk 
perception, safety precautions, demands for wage pre­
miums, and worker turnover-and it is up to each com­
pany to engage these forces in the most cost-effective 
way to promote safety. OSHA underscores this flexibil­
ity not by requiring a specific labeling format but by re­
quiring companies to educate workers about chemical 
hazards and to label all hazardous chemicals. Indus­
tries that now have labeling programs, such as the · 
paint and coating industry, may continue to use them. 
Performance-oriented and market-com­
plementing regulation enlarges the role that business 
can play in promoting safety at the same time that it 
creates incentives for managers to understand the con­
nection between the market's interest in safety and 
profitability. The older standard-based and command­
and-control approach has the reverse effect. Bicycles 
meeting the regulations of the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, for example, must bear a tag with 
the statement, "Meets U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
Commission regulations for bicycles/' and the label 
must be "at least 6.4 cm (2.5 in.) by 17.8 cm17 in.J set­
ting forth the required labeling statement legibly and 
conspicuously in capital letters at least 0.6 cm (0.25 in.) 
high." Such narrowly drawn policies ignore the con­
structive possibilities of linking forces with the opera­
tion of the market. Neither business nor society can 
afford to maintain this sort of ignorance. � 
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Politics & economics 
... politics differs from economics in three important 
respects. 
First. politics concerns preferences that do not 
always have a common monetary measuring rod. In 
an economic market, we seek to maximize our "util­
ity," a goal that substantively can be almost any­
thing but in practice involves things that have, or 
can easily be given, money values. We may wish to 
be saints or sinners, to feed the poor or to indulge 
our basest appetites; but so long as we do these 
things by consuming more of something when its 
(money) price goes down and consuming less of it 
when its (money) price goes up, the economist is 
indifferent to our ultimate purposes. 
... As voters, bureaucrats, or legislators, we may wish 
to regulate nuclear energy, provide more jobs for 
the unemployed, reduce the foreign trade deficit, 
curb inflation, and minimize the cost of government; 
but we have no way of expressing our choices 
among these partially competing goals in nonarbi­
trary, quantitative terms .... Unlike the economic 
market, where the observer can make the radical 
but reasonable assumption that each person has 
the same motive (rational wealth-maximization), in 
the political arena the observer can note only that 
each participant wants different things, and some­
times several different things simultaneously, and 
that each participant assigns a different but 
impossible-to-quantify value to each goal. ... 
Second, political action requires assembling major­
ity coalitions to make decisions that bind everyone 
whether or not he belongs to that coalition. When 
we make purchases in a market, we commit only 
ourselves, and we consume as much or as little of 
a given product as we wish. When we participate 
in making decisions in the political arena, we are 
implicitly committing others as well as ourselves, 
and we are "consuming" not only a known product 
(such as the candidate for whom we vote) but also 
a large number of unknown products (all the poli­
cies the winning candidate will help enact) .... 
The third and most important difference between 
economics and politics is that whereas economics 
is based on the assumption that preferences are 
given, politics must take into account the efforts 
made to change preferences. Consumers have 
"revealed preferences," the origin or value of which 
is of little importance. What people want is thought 
to arise from outside the market-to be "exoge­
nous." Only how much they purchase is affected by 
the market. But much, if not most, of politics con­
sists of efforts to change wants by arguments, per­
suasion, threats, bluffs, and education .... 
From 
"The Polltics of Regulation," 
by James Q. Wilson 
in The Politics of Regulation, 
ed. James 0. Wilson 
(New York: Basic Books, 1980), 
pp. 362·363. 
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